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Abstract 
 
We  adopt  a  multi-theoretic  approach  to  investigate  a  previously unexplored phenomenon  in 
extant  literature, namely the differential impact of ownership identity and director dominate 
shareholding on the performance of emerging market firms. The main research question addressed is, 
whether the impact of this relationship is conditional on the identity of the block investor. First, the 
relationship between overall block ownership and firm performance is tested by employing multiple 
regressions on 500 firm-year observations for the period from 2007 to 2011. Then, the block 
ownership is classified as the state, individuals, insiders, financial institutions, corporate and foreign 
investors and the influence of these identities on firm performance is examined. It was found that only 
the ownership categories such as the government, institutions and foreign ownership have positive 
influence on the firm performance. The results also indicate that high level of insider ownership also 
negatively associated with the firm performance. The main contribution of this paper is the 
examination of the relationship between block ownership and firm performance from the perspective 
of the identity of investors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The corporate governance literature classifies 
ownership identity as an influential internal 
governance mechanism (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Agency theory highlights that principals and agents 
often have conflicting goals and capacities to 
influence corporate behaviour and outcomes 
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). An important 
contribution of agency theory is that it facilitates a 
structured approach to the analysis of economic 
motivations and the incentives of managers and 
shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, agency 
theory has been criticized in the sociology literature 
for its failure to pay sufficient attention to the context 
in which exchange and principal-agent relations are 
embedded (Hamilton & Biggart, 1988). 
Studies that investigated ownership structure and 
performance relationship focused only on the 
conventional separation of ownership and control 
concept, in reality there are many different types of 
ownership in existence, for example, institutional 
investors, corporate investors, government investors, 
individual investors, insider ownership (Boone et al., 
2011). These ownership types have different 
behavioral characteristics which provide them with 
different levels of involvement in companies. 
The increased volatility of corporate ownership 
portfolios observed in recent years has led to renewed 
interest in ownership structures, especially with 
respect to multinational enterprises. As the economies 
of the world become more and more globally 
integrated, such issues will become more prominent 
and will affect our understanding of the interweaving 
systems of corporate relations, through which formal 
and informal networks of power are established 
(Heubischl, 2006 and Pfeffer, 1972). They can be 
understood as a potential source for inter-corporate 
power and coordination leading to corporate control. 
We investigate this issue by analyzing a sample 
of KSE-100 indexed Pakistani companies where 
outside block ownership is common but does not 
necessarily reside with one category of investors. The 
argument advanced in this study is that the 
blockholders represent different segments of investors 
in the market (corporate, individuals, institutions, 
state, foreign and director ownership) and therefore, 
their incentives to monitor managers can vary from 
one group to another. In a non-homogenous block 
ownership environment, it is important to account for 
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these differential influences in order to arrive at a 
conclusion about the relationship between ownership 
identity and firm performance. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: 
Section II reviews the relevant literature on ownership 
identity and performance relationship. Section III 
provides Hypotheses development and IV description 
about Pakistani environment while Section V 
describes the data collection procedure and analytical 
methodology employed. This is followed by the 
discussion of empirical findings in Section VI. The 
last section offers some conclusions on the topic. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
a) Ownership Identity 
 
According to Zeitun & Gary (2007), ownership 
structure depends on a countrв’s socТal, polТtТcal, 
economic and cultural norms. In an emerging market 
like Pakistan, these factors are likely to be entirely 
different from those of developed countries, which 
may limit the application of empirical models tested 
in mature markets. 
There is substantial empirical literature on the 
impact of ownership structure on the financial 
efficiency of firms (Morck et al., 2000; Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003; Burkart et al, 2003; Caselli & Gennaioli, 
2003; Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006; Villalonga 
& Amit, 2006; Balsmeyer & Czarnitzki, 2010; and 
Bozec et al, 2010). The findings, however, are not 
conclusive and the spectrum of results is quite wide. 
Thus, for US firms the analysis by Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) and Holderness (2003) revealed no 
relationship between ownership structure and 
performance. Studies conducted by Claessens & 
Djankov, (1999); Gorton & Schmid, (2000); Sarkar & 
Sarkar (2000); Sun & Tong, (2003) and Lee, (2008) 
report that the financial performance of a firm is 
positively influenced by the level of ownership 
structure. While Franks & Mayer (2001) find a higher 
turnover of directors in closely held firms in 
comparison to their widely held counterparts, 
investigations conducted by Kaplan & Minton (1994) 
and Kang & Shivdasani (1995) reveal that firms with 
block shareholdings are more likely to replace 
managers or to restructure their firms following a 
period of underperformance. Additionally, the 
presence of large shareholders increases the 
susceptibility of a firm to and probability of a 
takeover thereby proving managers with incentives to 
generate attractive returns to shareholders (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986 and Shivdasani, 1993). 
Many empirical studies that have investigated 
the relationship between block ownership and firm 
performance have analyzed either the overall level of 
block ownership (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz, 
and Villalonga, 2001) or just inside block ownership 
(Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; 
Craswell et al., 1997; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Short 
and Keasey,  1999) or block ownership samples 
gathered in unique microstructure settings such as 
bank block ownership in the bank centered economies 
of Japan and Germany (Morck, et al. 2000; Gorton 
and Schmid 2000), state non-tradable block 
ownership in China (Qi et al., 2000; Sun & Tong, 
2003; Wei et al., 2005; Gunasekarage et al., 2007) 
and, institutional and foreign block ownership in 
privatized firms (Claessens & Djankov, 1999). The 
findings reported in these studies are inconclusive. 
 
b) Director Domination Ownership 
 
Agency theory argued that dominating director 
ownership implies better incentives to monitor, 
greater incentive alignment, undeviating partaking 
and therefore higher expected profits and share prices 
(Larner, 1971; McEachern, 1975; Herman, 1981 and 
Sorenson, 1996). But higher insider ownership may 
also imply greater managerial entrenchment, 
diversion of funds and thereby leads to lower 
efficiency (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Morck et al, 
1988; Gugler, 1999; and Dyck & Zingales, 2004). 
A large number of empirical researches 
scrutinize the relationship between insider dominating 
shareholding and firm performance in developed 
countrТes аСТcС based on “sТnРle equatТon models” 
generally found a positive or perhaps insignificant 
relationship between insider ownership and 
performance (Short 1994), While non-linear 
relationships between managerial ownership and 
market valuation (e.g. Morck et al. 1988, McConnell 
and Servaes, 1990, Thomsen and Pedersen 2000). 
But, as mentioned, more recent simultaneous 
estТmatТons oП tСe “causes and consequences” oП 
insider ownership have found insignificant 
performance effects (Loderer & Martin 1997; and 
Himmelberg et al, 1999). 
Gugler, Mueller & Yurtoglu (2008) stated that in 
the US, firm performance initially rose with an 
increase in the insider ownership but fell when the 
insider ownership exceeded 60 percent of the 
companies. Loderer & Martin (1997) used the sample 
of 867 US companies found a weak bowl-shaped 
effect of director ownership on both measures 
estimated by simple regression. Therefore, research 
interpret these results as evidence that managers have 
inside knowledge and increase their shareholdings 
prior to good acquisitions whereas high share prices 
and Q-values induce them to sell out. 
Cho (1998) examines investment as an 
intermediate variable between director ownership and 
performance measured by Q-values of 326 Fortune 
500 firms in 1991. He found that Q-values have a 
positive impact on dominating director ownership and 
that director ownership has a significant non-
monotonous effect on investment, which again has a 
positive impact on Q-values. When taking this into 
account in a 3-equation model simultaneously 
determining director ownership, Q-values and 
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investment, the non-monotonous effect of ownership 
structure on Q-values becomes insignificant. 
However, previous research found a positive 
association between low levels of insider ownership 
and performance (Kim, Lee, & Francis, 1988; 
Mehran, 1995; Hossain, Prevost, & Rao, 2001; 
Elayan, Lau, & Meyer, 2003; Welch, 2003). On the 
other side, researchers report the relationship between 
dominating director ownership and firm performance 
is non-monotonic (Chen et al., 1993; Griffith, 1999; 
McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1988; Short & Keasey, 1999), supporting 
convergence-of-interest hypothesis at some low levels 
of insider ownership and an entrenchment hypothesis 
at higher levels of director ownership which indicate 
non-linear relationship between ownership and 
performance. However, stewardship theorist claims 
that there is no relationship between insider 
ownership and performance (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz 
& Lehn, 1985; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). 
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
 
The standard assumption is that each of the ownership 
categories has different objective with implications 
for corporate strategy and performance (Edwards & 
Nibler, 2000; Morck et al., 2000 and Thomsen & 
Pedersen, 2000). Thomsen & Pedersen (2002) argue 
that the identity of large owners e.g. family, bank, 
institutional investors, government, and other 
companies has important implications for corporate 
strategy and performance. Evidence suggests that 
blockholder identity may matter because shareholders 
can have heterogeneous incentives and capacities to 
monitor managers (Gedajlovic, 1993 and Thomsen & 
Pederson, 2000). 
 
a) Associate Company Shareholding 
 
In corporate shareholding or associated company 
shareholding is that where the shares are held by one 
company in another. Business groups are also one of 
the major ownership categories that also called 
associated company ownership or family ownership.  
Business groups consist of a collection of firms, 
which are linked together by common ownership, and 
director interlocks. Group affiliation has both benefits 
and costs. Among the beneficial effects, Chang and 
Hong (2000) find that group companies serve as an 
organizational structure for appropriating quasi rents, 
which accrue from access to scarce and imperfectly 
marketed inputs such as capital and information. 
Khanna and Rivkin (2001) defined Business group as 
a set of firms which, though legally independent are 
bound together by a group of formal and informal ties 
and are accustomed to taking coordinated action. 
However, groups are also associated with the larger 
possibility of (i) inefficient transfer of resources from 
more profitable firms to financially constrained firms 
(Shin and Park, 1999) and (ii) exploitation of minority 
shareholders by means of tunneling of resources 
through pyramids and extensive crossholdings by the 
controlling family (Johnson et al., 2000, and Bertrand 
et al., 2002). 
Alchain (1969) argued that group business create 
the internal capital market facility. Scharfstein & 
Stein (1994) extended the Alchain argument by 
comparing the financing arrangement with-in the 
group and financing through bank (in case bank is not 
a group member). They argued that group headquarter 
is better able to monitor and access to information 
regarding member company than bank. Where capital 
market is underdeveloped, business groups facilitate 
capital allocation among group members (Perotti & 
Gelfer, 2001). Hoshi (1991), and Kim & 
Limpaphayom, (1998), in their studies found that 
Japanese keiretsu structure of companies had close 
relationship with their main bank and this relationship 
played a significant role in reducing the costs of 
financial distress. Kester (1986); Berglof & Perotti 
(1994) argued that keiretsu structure also reduces the 
informational asymmetries between creditors and 
shareholders. 
Hypothesis H1a: There is a positive relationship 
between the higher proportion of corporate 
ownership and profitability among Pakistani firms. 
 
b) Directors’ Shareholding 
 
The classical publication of Adam Smith (1776: 700) 
Сave suРРested tСat “neРlТРence and proПusТon, 
tСereПore, must Сave prevaТl” Тn manaРement 
controlled companies because it cannot be expected 
tСat tСose аСo manРe otСers’ moneв аТll аatcС over 
it with the same “anбТous vТРТlance” as tСeв аould 
watch over their own. Meanwhile, Jensen & Meckling 
(1976) and Fama & Jensen (1983) argue that insider 
ownership can cause two types of fully differentiated 
behaviour: convergence of interests with shareholders 
and the entrenchment effect.  
McKnight & Weir (2009) found that higher 
managerial ownership reduces company agency costs, 
supporting the earlier findings of Coles, Lemmon and 
Mescke (2005). This may be because higher personal 
shareholding by directors bonds them to the company 
and acts as a method for mitigating agency costs in 
listed companies. Studies by Ang, Cole & Lin, (2000) 
and Singh & Davidson (2003) validate that higher 
director ownership reduces the misalignment between 
shareholders and managers and lowers agency costs. 
However, an optimal level of insider ownership is 
determined by firm size, industry, investor protection 
level, and performance of the firm (Hu & Izumida, 
2008). 
Previous studies find mixed results for director 
ownership and its effects on the firm value and 
performance. Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz & Lehn 
(1985) argue that insider ownership and company 
financial value have endogenous effects and that there 
should be no systematic relationship. However, 
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controlling the endogenous effect of insider 
ownership and company financial performance, 
Bohren and Odegaard (2001) find a positive 
relationship between insider ownership and company 
value in the Norwegian context. 
In a review of a number of these studies; 
Hypothesis H1b: There is a positive relationship bОtаООn thО hiРhОr proportion oП insidОr’s oаnОrship 
and profitability among Pakistani firms. 
 
c) Individual Public Shareholding 
 
In many emerging countries, public ownership is 
among the largest group of blockholders (Claessens et 
al., 2000). Sun & Tong (2003) reported that public 
ownership has positive impact on firm performance 
aПter sСare Тssue prТvatТгatТon, usТnР lТsted ПТrms’ data 
during the period 1994-2000. Delios & Wu (2005) 
reported a U-pattern relationship between individual 
public ownersСТp and TobТn’s Q usТnР tСe data oП 
publТc ПТrms lТsted on CСТna’s tаo stocФ eбcСanРes 
during 1991-2001. In a review of a number of these 
studies: 
Hypothesis H1c: There is a positive relationship 
between the higher public shareholding and 
profitability among Pakistani firms. 
 
d) Foreign Shareholders 
 
It is important to disentangle the effects of foreign 
ownership in a firm belonging to foreign industrial 
corporations and foreign financial institutions. 
Agency theory suggests that since foreign corporate 
ownership stakes are larger and less fragmented than 
stakes held by foreign institutional shareholders, the 
incentives of these larger shareholders are more 
aligned to perform an effective monitoring role. Gorg 
& Greenaway (2004) argue that the main challenging 
question in the international business strategy is the 
outcome gained from foreign ownership of firms. It is 
mainly accepted that foreign ownership plays a 
crucial role in firm performance, particularly in 
developing and transitional economies. There are 
important governance implications for firms with and 
without foreign holdings which ultimately have a 
bearing on the performance of firms. These 
performance differences arise from the possession of 
certain firm specific advantages that accrue to the firm 
with foreign ownership. These firm specific 
advantages stem from advanced technological know-
how, marketing and managing skills, export contacts, 
coordinated relationships with suppliers and 
customers and reputation (Aitken & Harrison, 1999). 
Empirical studies found evidence supporting 
such a conjecture. For instance, Boardman, Shapiro & 
Vining (1997) find significant performance 
differences among multinational enterprises or their 
subsidiaries and domestic firms in Canada. Harris & 
Robinson (2003) report that presence of foreign 
owners in companies in the UK manufacturing 
industry leads to an improvement in the productivity. 
Chibber & Majumdar, (1999) find that the extent of a 
ПoreТРn ПТrm’s control over a domestТc ПТrm Тs 
positively associated with the degree of resource 
commitment to technology transfer. Djankov & 
Hoekman (2000) find foreign investment is directly 
associated with the provision of generic knowledge 
and specific knowledge. Goethals & Ooghe (1997) in 
their study of Belgium (held on 50 foreign and 25 
local companies) concluded that foreign companies 
have a better financial performance compared to 
domestic companies. Among emerging economies, 
Willmore (1986) analyzing a matched sample of 
foreign and domestic  firms  in Brazil and  finds  
foreign firms  to  have  higher  ratios  of  value-added 
to  output,  higher  labor  productivity  and greater 
capital intensity among others. However, from 
Thailand Wiwattanakantang (2001) found that foreign 
controlled firms exhibit superior performance. 
As a consequence, we expect to find a positive 
relationship between the foreign ownership and firm 
performance of Pakistani corporations: 
Hypothesis H1d: There is a positive relationship 
between the higher proportion of foreign ownership 
and profitability among Pakistani firms. 
 
e) State Shareholding 
 
The government shares are held by the federal and 
provincial State. State ownership is an involvement 
ownership type because governments have power not 
only from the corporate legal property right point of 
view, but from state policy setting, implementation 
and reputation. 
De Alessi (1980 & 1982) defines state-owned 
enterprТses as ‘polТtТcal’ ПТrms аТtС Рeneral publТc as a 
collective owner. A specific characteristic of these 
firms is that individual citizens have no direct claim 
on their residual income and are not able to transfer 
their ownership rights. Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny 
(1996) argue that in most cases the agency problem in 
government owned companies arises from political 
issues rather than managerial issues. 
However, Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny (1996) 
argue that in most cases the agency problem in 
government owned companies arises from political 
issues rather than managerial issues. The conflict of 
interest between government and other owners often 
arises because the State is more interested in political 
outcomes compared to the other owners who are more 
interested in the financial returns. Gursoy & Aydogan 
(2002) found that when compared to the family-
owned companies, government-owned companies 
have lower accounting-based returns but higher 
market-based returns in Turkish listed companies. 
Sun, Tong & Tong (2002) report that the relationship 
betаeen Рovernment oаners and CСТnese companТes’ 
performance follow an inverted U-shape pattern. 
Accordingly, we propose the following 
hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis H1e: There is a positive relationship 
between the higher proportion of state ownership and 
profitability among Pakistani firms. 
 
f) Institutional Shareholding 
 
The role of financial institutions on the theoretical 
literature of ownership identity has been crucial 
pragmatic as anti-takeover barriers (Sheard, 1991). 
Meanwhile, Gedajlovic & Shapiro (2002) argue that 
these financial institutions are well positioned to 
monitor the executives of the firms within their 
network. Heaw-Wellalage & Locke (2011) stated 
from Sri Lanka that institutional ownership is 
predominant and approximately 95% of multinational 
subsidiaries are owned and operated by institutional 
investors and performed betters as compare to 
domestic companies. Hayashi (2003) found that 
institutional ownership was responsible for 60% of all 
outstanding equity in US, compared to 8% in 1950. 
As a result of the growing volume of equity controlled 
by institutional owners, the role of institutional 
investors has changed from passive investors to active 
monitors. Meanwhile, Chirinko et al. (1999) explain 
that financial institutions might be important mainly 
because of their role as supplier of debt but also as 
equity holder and their representation on supervisory 
board. Jensen (1989) argues that joint ownership of 
debt and equity by large informed investors results in 
stringent managerial monitoring and create strong 
incentive for managers to make value maximizing 
decisions. Cornett et al. (2007) explain institutional 
shareholders have more opportunity, resources and 
ability to monitor and influence managers. 
Institutional shares are held by investment bank, 
insurance companies, mutual fund companies and/or 
other investment institutions. Nickel, Nicolitsas & 
Dryden (1997) did not found the effect of dominant 
external shareholders on company performance, 
except when the dominant external shareholder is a 
financial institution. Chaganti & Damanpour (1991) 
investigated the effect of institutional investors that 
presence of higher proportion of institutional investor 
leads to relatively higher performance. Xu and Wang 
(1997) found positive and significant correlation 
between profitability and large institutional 
shareholders in China. 
Navissi & Naiker (2006) find institutional 
owners have greater incentive to monitor management 
in New Zealand context, and it positively affects 
ПТrms’ ПТnancТal perПormance. TСТs maв be due to Пact 
that unlike boards of directors, institutional investors 
have increasingly used their power to pressure 
manaРers to come Тnto lТne аТtС tСe sСareСolders’ 
interests (Cornett et al., 2007). Moreover, higher 
institutional ownership is always associated with 
higher board remuneration and incentive-related 
executive compensation, and it reduces the likelihood 
of CEO dualТtв on tСe board (Henrв, 2010). Gürbüг, 
Aybars & Kutlu (2010) analyze 164 firms from 
Turkey and demonstrate a positive relationship 
between corporate governance and institutional 
ownership on firm financial performance. Clay (2001) 
finds a significant positive relationship between 
company performance and institutional ownership 
percentage in US, where a 1% increase in institutional 
ownership leads to 0.75% increase in company 
financial performance. Similar results were found by 
Lin (2010) who posits that when the institutional 
ownership is higher than 81.2% in Taiwanese 
companies, firm values start to increase.  
Hartzell & Starks (2003) find that institutional 
ownership mitigates agency costs between 
shareholders and managers, because it increases the 
monitoring. In line with the above findings, using 
firms from the North American casino industry, Tasi 
& Gu (2007) posit a negative agency costs 
relationship between institutional ownership and 
agency costs. However, Henry (2010) employed 
Australian listed companТes’ data and Пound neРatТve 
results. In a review of a number of these studies: 
Hypothesis H1f: There is a positive relationship 
between the higher proportion of Institutional 
ownership and profitability among Pakistani firms. 
 
g) Others’ Categories of Shareholding 
 
Other categories of the shareholding consist of public 
companies, charitable and other trusts, NGOs, 
Cooperative societies, etc. Literature is considerably 
thin about this class of ownership and need to 
research on it seriously. These blockholders usually 
have a long investment horizon. Allen and Philips 
(2000) present evidence that supports the argument 
that corporate ownership provides significant benefits 
to firms involved in certain business agreements by 
reducing the costs of monitoring the alliances or 
ventures between firms. 
Hypothesis H1g: There is a positive relationship bОtаООn thО hiРhОr proportion oП ‘othОrs catОРoriОs’ 
of ownership and profitability among Pakistani firms. 
 
4. Corporate Landscape in Pakistan 
 
The ownership structure of companies in Pakistan 
together with other governance mechanisms makes an 
investigation of block ownership in this country 
interesting. First, being an emerging economy with a 
relatively inactive market for corporate control, 
Pakistan investors can be expected to rely on internal 
governance mechanisms such as block ownership to 
minimize agency conflict and to generate a return for 
their investment. Second, and in relation to the first 
point, corporate ownership in Pakistan is 
characterized by a strikingly high level of 
concentrated ownership; this has remained unchanged 
for a long period of time. 
There are considerable differences in corporate 
governance frameworks and practices between 
Pakistan and most developing economies. Pakistan is 
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a common law country having one tier board structure 
and the majority of large public companies display 
concentrated ownership structures with strong family 
ownership or associate companies. As a result, the 
Pakistani corporate environment is characterized by 
power asymmetries among controlling shareholders, 
minority shareholders and management, in favor of 
the first. In order to improve the corporate governance 
environment in Pakistan, an array of institutional and 
government initiatives have been implemented from 
last decade. Institutional investors, National 
Investment Trust (NIT), Investment Corporation of 
Pakistan (ICP), have increased their participation as 
minority shareholders of large public companies and 
currently play an important role in developing local 
corporate governance practices. 
Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan (SECP) is the principal regulator of 
securities market and non-bank companies, including 
non-listed companies. State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) 
regulates Commercial Banks & Non-Banking 
Financial Institutions with prudential regulations. 
Since its establishment, it has initiated a number of 
reforms aimed at improving corporate governance 
policies, structures and frameworks in Pakistan. The 
most important reform was the implementation of the 
code of Corporate Governance in March, 2002 and 
revised in May, 2012. 
Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance 
(PICG) playing a pivotal role in conjoining SBP and 
seventeen other associations that were all concerned 
with corporate governance. PICG is today a hybrid 
Institute of Governance and Institute of Directors. As 
the Institute of Governance, it increases awareness 
and champion the cause of good governance practices 
and, as the Institute of Directors, it develops 
professionalism and encourages engagement of 
corporate bodies and individuals in the role of 
effective oversight. PICG providing knowledge about 
best practices in corporate governance to all key 
stakeholders affected by corporate governance by 
improving the quality of corporate governance in 
Pakistan. 
 
5. Methodology 
 
In line with prior studies that examine the relationship 
between ownership and firm performance (Gedajlovic 
and Shapiro, 1998; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; 
Khanna and Palepu, 2000), this research uses the 
following regression specification: 
Performance = f (ownership variables, control 
variables) 
 
a) Data Collection 
 
Our sample comprised KSE – 100 index companies 
for five years 2007 to 2011. Companies were 
excluded in case of non availability of data and/or 
missing data. According to the Karachi Stock 
EбcСanРe oППТcТal brocСure (PublТsСed Тn 2012) “TСe 
KSE-100 Index was introduced in November 1991 
with base value of 1,000 points. The KSE - 100 Index 
comprises of 100 companies selected on the basis of 
sector representation and highest market 
capitalization, which captures over 90% of the total 
market capitalization of the companies listed on the 
Exchange. Out of the following 33 Sectors, 32 
companies are selected i.e. one company from each 
sector (excluding Open-End Mutual Fund Sector) on 
the basis of the largest market capitalization and the 
remaining 66 companies are selected on the basis of 
largest market capitalization in descending order. This 
is a total return index i.e. dividend, bonus and rights 
are adУusted.” (p. 7) 
Data on required variables is collected through 
secondary sources. Data on Corporate Governance 
internal mechanism are collected through company 
information page, compliance with the code of 
corporate Рovernance report, dТrectors’ proПТles and 
dТrectors’ report to the shareholders. Data related to 
financial part of the study is collected from financial 
statement part of Annual Reports. 
 
b) Reliability Analysis 
 
Reliability analysis was used to assess internal 
consistency (degree of homogeneity among the 
items). CronbacС’s AlpСa coeППТcТents аere computed 
and the overall assessment was 0.87. According to 
Nunnally (1978), a data collection instrument with a 
Рood Тnternal consТstencв sСould Сave CronbacС’s 
Alpha coefficients that are higher than 0.7. The items 
were therefore, found to be highly homogeneous. 
 
Variables 
 
The variables employed in our equations are 
described in Table 1. 
 
a) Performance Variable 
 
The concept of enterprise performance allows many 
interpretations. In applied studies it is common to 
associate improvements in firm performance with 
increased profitability, higher efficiency, and 
increased output (Bevan et al., 1999). 
 Demsetz & Villalonga (2001) divided the 
measures according to the time perspectives and the 
measuring identity: the accounting profit is backward-
looking and are calculated by accountants under the 
constraТnts oП standards; TobТn’s q, on tСe otСer Сand, 
is forward-looking and are caught by the community 
of investors under the constraints of markets. 
The variables employed in this study for firm 
profitability were ROE (return on equity), ROA 
(return on assets), TobТn’s Q (Q) and EVA (EconomТc 
Value Added). 
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Table 1. Description of variables 
Ownership Identity Variables 
(
A 
Corporate Ownership  (O_COR) Percentage of associated company ownership in a company to the total equity. 
B
) 
Individual Ownership (O_IND) Percentage of Individual Public ownership in a company to the total equity. 
(
C) 
Director Ownership (O_DIR) Percentage of Company Directors ownership in a company to the total equity. 
(
D) 
Institutional Ownership (O_INS) PercentaРe oП InstТtutТonal Тnvestor’s oаnersСТp Тn a companв to tСe total 
equity. 
(
E) 
Foreign Ownership (O_FOR) PercentaРe oП ПoreТРn Тnvestor’s oаnersСТp Тn a companв to tСe total equity. 
(
F) 
State Ownership (O_STA) Percentage of Government ownership in a company to the total equity. 
(
G) 
OtСer’s OаnersСТp (O_OTH) Percentage of ownership other than above said types in a company to the total 
equity. 
(
H) 
Director Domination (D_DOM) CompanТes СavТnР more tСan 51% eбecutТve dТrector’s domТnatТon. 
Performance Variable 
(
I) 
Return on Equity (ROE) Net Profit divided by Total Equity (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Gugler & 
Yurtoglu, 2003 and Bjuggren & Wiberg, 2008) 
(
J) 
Return on Assets (ROA) Net Profit divided by Total Assets (Barber & Lyon, 1996; Core, Guay & 
Rusticus, 2006 and Bhagat & Bolton, 2010) 
(
K) 
Tobin Q (Q) The ratio between the market value and replacement value of the same 
physical asset (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003; 
Bjuggren & Wiberg, 2008) 
(
L) 
Economic Value Added (EVA) Net Operating Profit After Taxation (NOPAT) 
Weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
Invested Capital (IC) 
EVA = NOPAT – (WACC x IC) 
Control Variables 
(
M) 
Financial Leverage (FL) Total Debt/Total Equity (Jensen, 1986 and Kim & Sorensen, 1986) 
(
N) 
Firm Size (F_SIZE) Natural Logarithm of Total Assets (Pedersen & Thomsen, 1999) 
(
O) 
Firm Age (F_AGE) Number of years from the incorporation (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Han & 
Suk, 1998) 
 
b) Control Variable 
 
Financial Leverage, measured as the ratio of debt to 
capital employed, is included as a control variable in 
tСe reРressТon models because a ПТrm’s capТtal 
structure may influence its investment decisions and 
the discretion afforded managers (Harris & Raviv, 
1991). 
Firm value will be included in the equation for 
ownership concentration to deal with the potential 
problem of reverse causality: it has been argued that 
although ownership may affect performance, 
ownership structure may also be affected by the firm 
leverage. In line with Chen and Jaggi (2000), debt-to-
equity ratio (FLV) was used to measure firm leverage. 
A company increases its leverage with the 
intention of increasing its return on stockholder 
equity. A 1.5 ratio indicates that the company is using 
Rs. 1 in equity financing for each Rs. 1.50 in assets. 
The ratio provides a direct relationship: the higher the 
ratio, the higher the debt, or the lower the ratio, the 
lower the debt. A ratio of one indicates that the 
company has no debt. 
In the existing empirical studies ownership 
concentration tends to be negatively affected by firm 
size (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, Himmelberg et al. 
1999). This result reflects probably wealth limitations 
(it is simply more costly to acquire large portion of 
equity in larger firms) and the concern with risk 
diversification. But size is also sometimes considered 
as a proxy for managerial discretion (Himmelberg et 
al., 1999); in that case we expect size will positively 
affect ownership concentration. Size may also be 
viewed by potential shareholders as a proxy for 
reputation. I measure size as the natural logarithm of 
tСe ПТrm’s assets. 
 
6. Findings and Discussions 
 
a) Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the 
sample data. The highest mean value is for corporate 
ownership that is 41.6%, the highest percentage of 
corporate ownership is 98.9%, and the lowest 
ownership representation is 0%. This is consistent 
with the view that group ownership/corporate 
ownership of listed companies in Pakistan is relatively 
high. The highest director ownership in the sample 
data is 90%, while 8% firms of the KSE-100 are 
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directors dominating. Nevertheless, Bhabra (2007) 
reports an average director ownership for her sample 
of larger New Zealand firms was 9.34%, and Short 
and Keasey (1999) report an average insider 
ownership of 13% in their UK sample. Overall, 
companies listed on the KSE-100 indexed companies 
СavТnР СТРСer dТrector’s oаnersСТp compared to 
companies in developed markets.  
The mean of domestic public ownership is 17% 
while institutional shareholding is 11%. This indicates 
that a very high percentage of shares on the Karachi 
stock market are owned by institutional investors and 
general public. Foreign ownership highest is 84% 
while the mean value is 9.9% that is 5th largest form 
of ownership in Pakistani companies. The market 
based financial performance measure, Tobin’s Q, Сas 
a mean of 1.034 that is comparable to developed 
markets. However, the return on equity (ROE) and 
return on assets (ROA) mean values are 0.13 and 
0.069 respectively; which indicates that KSE listed 
companies are not performing well. The control 
variables, firm age, leverage and log of firm size are 
also listed. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (N = 475) 
 
 Min Max Mean SD 
Individual Ownership (O_IND) 0.00 1.00 0.169 0.176 
State Ownership (O_STA) 0.00 0.90 0.069 0.194 
Institutional Ownership (O_INS) 0.00 0.586 0.109 0.107 
Corporate Ownership (O_COR) 0.00 0.989 0.416 0.315 
Director Ownership (O_DIR) 0.00 0.90 0.108 0.205 
Foreign Ownership (O_FOR) 0.00 0.84 0.099 0.150 
Other Type Ownership (O_OTH) 0.00 0.46 0.030 0.080 
Director Dominate Firms (DOM_D) 0.00 1.0 0.080 0.272 
Firm Age (F_Age) 5 152 37.19 26.68 
Firm Size (F_Size) 5.112 9.061 7.397 0.703 
Financial Leverage (FL) 0.00 3.607 0.148 0.268 
Economic Value Added (EVA) 0 1 0.37 0.484 
Return on Equity (ROE) -14.743 1.772 0.130 0.792 
Return on Assets (ROA) -0.876 0.531 0.069 0.135 
TobТn’s Q 0.047 9.160 1.034 1.095 
 
b) Correlation Test 
 
The influence of overall ownership structure on firm 
performance has been studied in many markets. In 
order to provide evidence on this aspect for Pakistan, 
we first analyze the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance. The correlation 
matrix among ownership structure, firm performance 
measures and other control variables is tabulated in 
Table 3. It is worth notification that the four firm 
performance variables are highly correlated each 
other. This proves that the selection of these four 
performance measures is reasonable since they test 
the firm performance in same perspectives. The 
results stated that high level of individual ownership 
Тs neРatТvelв correlated аТtС ROA, TobТn’s Q and 
EVA. While, high level of state ownership in sample 
companТes Тs posТtТvelв correlated аТtС ROA, TobТn’s 
Q and EVA. Both results are consistent with the all 
three types of performance measurement. 
The higher level of institutional ownership has 
positive relationships with EVA and negative 
correlatТon аТtС TobТn’s Q.  
TСe relatТonsСТp betаeen dТrector’s domТnating 
organization and market based performance measure 
(TobТn’s Q) Тs neРatТve, аСТcС ТndТcates tСat tСe 
market performance of director dominating 
companies is poor. 
Results of Table 3 also reveals that firms with 
СТРСer level oП dТrector’s oаnersСТp Сas negative 
impact on the economic performance of the company. 
 
c) Regression Analysis 
 
TСe R² value аas 9.1%, 20.6% & 18.8%, tСТs аas 
adУusted to 8.0%, 14% & 13.5% (R² adУusted) 
respectively. 
To conclude, the results from Table 4 shows that 
a significant negative relationship exists between 
ROE, TobТn’s Q and dТrector domТnated companТes 
and higher level of domestic public ownership 
variables (p = 0.000, < 0.05). The higher level of 
institutional ownership variable is significant for 
ROA and TobТn’s Q аТtС the F-statistics reported at 
0.560, 2.942 and 2.455, Since prob.(F)<0.05, and 
significant relationship exists between the variables. 
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Table 3. Correlation Coefficient Analaysis (N = 475) 
 
Variables O_IND O_STA O_COR O_ISN O_DIR O_FOR O_OTH DOM_D ROE ROA TobТn’s Q 
DIS_O .756 (.000) 
          
O_STA -.216 (.000) 
.          
O_COR -.461 (.000) 
-.322 
(.000) 
         
O_ISN .119 (.009) 
-.145 
(.002) 
-.163 
(.000) 
        
O_DIR .029 (.525) 
-.109 
(.017) 
-.474 
(.000) 
-.176 
(.000) 
       
O_FOR -.121 (.432) 
-.200 
(.322) 
.011 
(.000) 
.211 
(.061) 
-.112 
(.090) 
      
DOM_D -.023 (.614) 
-.038 
(.404) 
-.388 
(.000) 
-.165 
(.000) 
.844 
(.000) 
.111 
(.019) 
     
O_OTH -.197 (.555) 
.059 
(.873) 
-.056 
(.076) 
.098 
(.074) 
.033 
(.100) 
-.186 
(.111) 
.121 
(.099) 
    
ROE -.002 (.971) 
.045 
(.326) 
-.047 
(.310) 
.063 
(.174) 
-.043 
(.353) 
.129 
(.247) 
-.900 
(.070) 
-.039 
(.401) 
   
ROA -.201 (.000) 
.102 
(.026) 
.071 
(.125) 
.060 
(.191) 
-.083 
(.073) 
.011 
(.195) 
.089 
(.120) 
-.052 
(.262) 
.323 
(.000) 
  
Tobin Q -.170 (.000) 
.150 
(.001) 
.054 
(.241) 
-.111 
(.016) 
-.077 
(.094) 
.011 
(.025) 
.344 
(.200) 
-.096 
(.037) 
.120 
(.009) 
.299 
(.000) 
 
EVA -.096 (.037) 
.088 
(.050) 
.000 
(.993) 
.169 
(.000) 
-.102 
(.027) 
.199 
(.312) 
.132 
(.333) 
-.039 
(.402) 
.156 
(.001) 
.348 
(.000) 
.195 
(.000) 
 
Table 4. Regression Analysis Results 
 
 
d) Hypotheses Justification 
 
Hypothesis H1a: Associated company ownership has a 
positive effect on firm performance. 
The Linear Regression results: ROE (r=0.165, 
p<0.05), ROA (r=0.401, p<0.05), TobТn’s Q (r=0.238, 
p<0.05) and EVA (r=0.275, p<0.05). Correlation 
results: ROE (β= 0.310, p<0.05), ROA (β=0.125, 
p<0.05), TobТn’s Q (β= 0.241, p<0.05) and EVA (β = 
0.993, p<0.05). The relationship was not significant, 
and hypothesis H1a was rejected. 
Hypothesis H1b: DirОctor’s oаnОrship (insidОr 
ownership) has a positive effect on firm performance. 
The Linear Regression results: ROE (r=0.392, 
p<0.05), ROA (r=0.195, p<0.05), TobТn’s Q (r=0.804, 
p<0.05) and EVA (r=-0.022, p<0.05). Correlation 
results: ROE (β= 0.353, p<0.05), ROA (β=0.173, 
p<0.05), TobТn’s Q (β= 0.094, p<0.05) and EVA (β = 
Variables 
ROE ROA ToЛТn’s Q EVA 
t-Value 
(Prob.) 
t-Value 
(Prob.) 
t-Value 
(Prob.) 
t-Value 
(Prob.) 
O_IND -.551 (.582) 
-1.706 
(.089) 
-2.044 
(.042) 
-1.788 
(.074) 
O_STA -.746 (.456) 
-.982 
(.326) 
-1.619 
(.106) 
-1.175 
(.241) 
O_INS .392 (.695) 
.688 
(.009) 
2.966 
(.003) 
2.525 
(.012) 
O_COR -1.392 (.165) 
-.840 
(.401) 
-1.182 
(.238) 
-1.093 
(.275) 
O_DIR -.857 (.392) 
-1.299 
(.195) 
-.249 
(.804) 
-2.294 
(.022) 
O_FOR 0.982 (0.327) 
1.733 
(0.084) 
2.424 
(0.016) 
1.121 
(0.263) 
O_OTH .944 (.211) 
-.721 
(.544) 
.329 
(.100) 
1.100 
(.201) 
DOM_D -.018 (.006) 
.605 
(.545) 
0.857 
(.392) 
-2.056 
(.040) 
R² 0.091 0.206 0.188 0.209 
AНjustОН R² 0.080 0.140 0.135 0.144 
F-statistics 0.560 2.942 2.455 3.045 
Prob. (F.stat) 0.788 0.005 0.018 0.004 
Durbin-Watson 1.987 1.972 1.715 1.429 
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-0.027, p<0.05). The relationship was not significant, 
and hypothesis H1b was rejected. 
Hypothesis H1c: Public Ownership has a positive 
Effect on firm Performance. 
The Linear Regression results: ROE (r=0.582, 
p<0.05), ROA (r=0.089, p<0.05), TobТn’s Q (r=-
0.042, p<0.05) and EVA (r=-0.074, p<0.05). 
CorrelatТon results: ROE (β= 0.971, p<0.05), ROA 
(β=-0.000, p<0.05), TobТn’s Q (β= -0.000, p<0.05) 
and EVA (β = -0.037, p<0.05). The relationship was 
not significant, and hypothesis H1c was rejected. 
Hypothesis H1d: Foreign Shareholding has a 
positive effect on firm performance 
The Linear Regression results: ROE (r=0.327, 
p<0.05), ROA (r=0.084, p<0.05), TobТn’s Q (r=0.016, 
p<0.05) and EVA (r=-0.263, p<0.05). Correlation 
results: ROE (β= 0.247, p<0.05), ROA (β=0.195, 
p<0.05), TobТn’s Q (β= 0.025, p<0.05) and EVA (β = 
0.312, p<0.05). The relationship was significant, and 
hypothesis H1d was accepted. 
Hypothesis H1e: Government/State Shareholding 
has a positive effect on firm performance 
The Linear Regression results: ROE (r=0.456, 
p<0.05), ROA (r=0.326, p<0.05), TobТn’s Q (r=0.106, 
p<0.05) and EVA (r=0.241, p<0.05). Correlation 
results: ROE (β= 0.326, p<0.05), ROA (β=0.026, 
p<0.05), TobТn’s Q (β= 0.001, p<0.05) and EVA (β = 
0.050, p<0.05). The relationship was significant, and 
hypothesis H1e was accepted. 
Hypothesis H1f: Institutional Shareholding has a 
positive effect on firm performance 
The Linear Regression results: ROE (r=0.174, 
p<0.05), ROA (r=0.191, p<0.05), TobТn’s Q (r=-
0.016, p<0.05) and EVA (r=0.000, p<0.05). 
CorrelatТon results: ROE (β= 0.695, p<0.05), ROA 
(β=0.009, p<0.05), TobТn’s Q (β= 0.003, p<0.05) and 
EVA (β = 0.012, p<0.05). The relationship was 
significant, and hypothesis H1f was accepted. 
Hypothesis H1g: Other Categories of 
Shareholding has a positive effect on firm 
performance 
The Linear Regression results: ROE (r=0.211, 
p<0.05), ROA (r=0.544, p<0.05), TobТn’s Q (r=0.100, 
p<0.05) and EVA (r=0.201, p<0.05). Correlation 
results: ROE (β= 0.070, p<0.05), ROA (β=0.120, 
p<0.05), TobТn’s Q (β= 0.200, p<0.05) and EVA (β = 
-0.333, p<0.05). The relationship was not significant, 
and hypothesis H1g was rejected. 
 
7. Implications of the Findings 
 
a) There is not any significant relationship between 
Associate company/Corporate ownership and firm 
performance. The monitoring and control school of 
thought argues that the free-rider problems associated 
with diffuse ownership, since the majority shareholder 
captures most of the benefits associated with this 
monitoring. Associated company ownership or 
corporate ownership is the one of the largest 
shareholding recipe of Pakistani listed companies but 
this found out that this type of ownership does not 
having any impact on the firm performance in 
Pakistan. The results of the study have therefore, 
shown there is dire need to reasonably diversify 
shareholding as a way of attracting more skills and 
competencies among the shareholders that can be 
tapped to improve firm performance. 
b) There is a negative relationship between 
higher insider ownership and directors dominating 
ownership on firm performance. It has been argued 
that agency theory views managerial discretion as an 
opportunity for managers to serve their own 
objectives rather than the objectives of their 
controlling shareholders. The controlling shareholders 
may develop various strategies to prevent managers 
from using their decision making discretion to pursue 
self-serving objectives at the expense of firm 
performance. In fact, the study reaffirmed this 
position among listed companies in Pakistan. 
According to Chang and Wong (2003), strategic 
management of managerial discretion is dependent, to 
a large extent, on a comparison of the objectives of 
controlling shareholders and those of managers. 
Although it is now a well established fact that 
managers may have self-serving objectives, there is 
no priori that restricting managerial discretion will 
better serve the goal of maximizing firm performance. 
c) There is a negative relationship between 
high public ownership and firm performance. The 
global trend toward diffuse ownership has 
confounded many researchers, since it undermines the 
popular belief that executives are inherently self-
seeking and can easily wreck the organization if left 
without close monitoring. The findings have brought 
a new dimension that emphasizes block shareholding 
for creativity and innovation, and less monitoring by 
shareholders. Thus, diffuse ownership of firms does 
not provide environment for excellent policies to be 
developed and implemented by managers due to the 
Pakistani market structure with compare to the 
developed economies. The managers are therefore 
best informed regarding alternative uses for the 
Тnvestors’ Пunds. As a result, tСe manaРers end up 
with substantial residual control rights and discretion 
to allocate funds as they choose which creates agency 
issues. The downside of this argument is that it 
presumes that managers are honest, and always 
prepared to work in the objective interest of the 
shareholders, a position that is often not true. The fact 
that managers have most of the control rights can lead 
to problems of management entrenchment and rent–
seeking behavior. 
d) The positive and significant relationship 
between foreign ownership and firm performance 
appears to have gained universal acceptance across 
the globe due to a number of factors. First, mostly 
these foreign owned companies are from developed 
countries and have access to management systems 
whose efficacy has been tested in many contexts. The 
massive resource base and bail-out plans for fledgling 
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affiliates are other factors that enhance performance 
of foreign owned firms. However, the ability of these 
companies to re-organize their global operations to be 
able to assign more costs to harsh tax regimes and 
profits to tax havens in a bid to reduce their overall 
tax liability, is the most damning feature of foreign 
ownership. 
e) There is a significant positive relationship 
between government ownership and firm 
performance. Government ownership has been 
roundly criticized for contributing to generally poor 
performance of firms, due to excessive bureaucracy, 
tribalism, nepotism, poor human resource policies, 
political expediency in appointments and lack of 
respect for laws and regulations of the country. But 
the current study has confirmed this long-held 
position wrong. Most of the companies having strong 
state/government ownership are having monopolistic 
competition and enjoy the ultimate resources and 
discretionary powers. 
f) There is a positive relationship between 
Institutional ownership and firm performance. Most 
of previous studies have found positive significant 
relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance, due mainly to the differences in 
investment preferences, professional management and 
sСareСolders’ Рoals. InstТtutТonal Тnvestors manaРe 
savings collectively on behalf of other investors 
toward a specific objective in term of acceptable risk, 
return maximization, and mature of claims (Davis, 
2001). InstТtutТonal Тnvestors preПer to sТmplв “vote 
аТtС tСeТr Пeet’s” and sell oП poorlв perПormТnР ПТrms.  
g) There is no significant relationship 
between other ownership categories and firm 
performance. The findings have brought that these 
types of investment having live long relationships 
with the company and there is not any practical 
participation with the decision making process. Thus, 
this diffuse ownership of firms purchase shares like 
their saving and just care about the sustainability 
instead of any other specific corporate goal related to 
the performance of the company and they have 
sufficient latitude for innovation and creativity, that 
is, less monitoring by principals.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Using a panel of Pakistani listed firms during the 
period 2007 to 2011, this study examines the affects 
of ownership identity and director domination on firm 
financial performance by using market based 
performance measure, accounting based performance 
measure and as well economic profit of the firms. The 
results indicate a negative relationship of director 
ownership and financial performance. Furthermore, 
these findings suggest negative impact of associated 
company ownership and performance, indicating 
higher director ownership adverse effects on ROE and 
EVA and misalignment of the interests of 
management and owners. This study validate the 
agency issue are placed in Pakistani listed companies 
аСere tСe oаnersСТp structure and tСe ПТrm’s 
performance echo this. 
The results of this study have important 
ТmplТcatТons Пor tСe oаnersСТp structure, ТnsТder’s 
dominance and firm performance in Pakistan. It 
confirms that the effect of director ownership on firm 
performance is more negative where legal protection 
for investors is weak. It suggests that although new 
legislative reforms have been enacted, Pakistani 
companies are highly dependent on internal 
governance mechanisms. Due to high director/insider 
ownership, managerial expropriation is very likely to 
exist. There is potential merit in promulgating new 
rules and regulations to control the expropriation of 
minority shareholders. 
The findings provide direction for further 
research as to (i) what mechanisms are used by block 
investors such as the government, financial 
institutions and foreign investors in monitoring 
managers and (ii) why some categories of investors 
such as individuals, directors and corporate do not 
contribute to the internal governance of firms even 
though they invest a large amount of their wealth in 
these companies. 
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